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 INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE: 
A STUDY OF IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS IN TAIWAN 
 
Wai Fung Lam 
 
Abstract 
Taiwan’s irrigation management has faced a series of challenges in the 
past decades.  As the country’s economy developed, agriculture has ceased 
to be a viable economic activity; the decline of agriculture has in turn 
adversely affected the incentives of farmers and the government to engage in 
irrigation management.  Despite these challenges, the evolution of Taiwan’s 
irrigation systems in the past decades has been characterized by a high degree 
of resilience.  Although irrigation management is unlike that in the good old 
days when farmers actively engaged in meticulous management and were 
willing to contribute significant manual and monetary resources, farmers’ 
organizing abilities and social capital accumulated over the years have largely 
retained, and continued to sustain a vibrant management order.  The general 
picture is that while the sector as a whole has been in flux and gone through 
many changes, the vibrancy of the system remains.   
Drawing upon the literature of complexity studies and conceptualizing 
an irrigation system as a social-ecological system (SES), this paper seeks to 
explain and understand the institutional vibrancy and resilience of Taiwanese 
irrigation.  The major argument is that the design of Taiwan’s irrigation 
institutions, as a result of years of trial and error, has been able to cope with 
the dynamics inherent in the SES.  The institutions allow various actors and 
organizations at different levels to engage in continuous learning and 
adaptation.  I shall examine how disturbances of different types have impact 
the structure and dynamics of the Taiwanese system, how individuals and 
organizations at different levels have responded to the disturbances, and how 
these responses have constituted the systemic response to the changing 
environment.   
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Resilience amid Change in Taiwanese Irrigation 
 
Taiwan’s irrigation management has been facing a series of challenges in 
the last decades.  As the country industrialized, agriculture has lost its 
comparative advantage and become economically non-viable.  The 
over-production of paddy rice in Taiwan and worldwide has continued to 
keep the grain prices low; the opening up of Taiwan’s agricultural produce 
market to international competition as a result of Taiwan’s entry to the WTO 
is going to make agriculture even more difficult to sustain (AERC, 1999, 2000).  
The decline of agriculture has also brought about significant changes to the 
social context in which irrigation operates.  As the rural youth leave for cities 
to find better jobs, the farming population is ageing rapidly.1  All these social 
economic changes have adversely affected agriculture and rural infrastructure 
management.  At the national level, the decline of agriculture has given rise 
to the debates on the effective utilization of the country’s water resource 
across different economic sectors. 
Yet unlike in many other Asian countries where farming was simply 
abandoned in the process of industrialization, the agricultural sector in 
Taiwan remains relatively intact.  Back in the 1990s, Williams (1994) observed 
that, “the statistically much diminished role of agriculture is belied, though, 
by the physical impression conveyed by the rural landscape.  Traveling 
through the lush green countryside of Taiwan, one is impressed by the 
extraordinary degree of human occupancy… It is an intensely green and vivid 
landscape that leaves a lasting impression, particularly for someone used to 
the spacious checkerboard pattern of the American Midwest.” (p. 218).  
Williams’s observation is still largely valid nowadays.  In fact, while the 
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number of farmers who actually engage in farming activities might have 
decreased, the number of farm households has remained relatively steady.2  
Taiwanese farmers have shown unwillingness to give up on farming or their 
lands3; in many instances, farmers still engage in farming despite it means 
losing money!  Irrigation is largely in good order too.  Irrigation 
infrastructure is relatively well maintained, largely due to continuous 
investments by government and local Irrigation Associations (IAs).  Judging 
from the interviews with farmers during fieldwork, water distribution and 
allocation at the field level is also kept in good order.  Although active 
voluntary labor can no longer be found, the social infrastructure that has 
evolved over years of cooperation has not deteriorated too badly.  The close 
links between the Irrigation Associations and farmers are still relatively solid. 
In 2000, while agriculture accounted for about 2% of Taiwan’s GDP, it 
used up more than 78% of the country’s available water resource (COA, 2003; 
JTIA, 2000).4   As the economy develops and the domestic and industrial 
demands for water increase, the viability of the current distribution of water 
resource has been under constant challenge.  So far the irrigation sector has 
been successful in fending off the demands for a transfer of water rights from 
agriculture to other sectors.  In many instances, arrangements have been 
made to transfer the use, but not the rights, of water resource from the 
irrigation sector.  An important question is how the dynamics underlying 
water resource management at the macro level affects the way farmers and 
irrigation institutions adapt to the changing environment. 
The macro governance structure of Taiwan has also undergone drastic 
changes, which have had significant implications for irrigation management.  
Irrigation management is never a mere engineering or local issue.  
Particularly in Taiwan, agriculture and irrigation has a long history of 
government involvement, and in fact has been used as a tool by the 
government to govern the rural populace (Foster, 2001; Stavis, 1974).  Since 
the transformation of the Taiwanese polity from an authoritarian regime to 
one of competitive party politics in the late 80s, politicians have not hesitated 
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to exploit issues of agriculture and irrigation to advance their political 
interests.  Politicization has generated uncertainty and shocks to the 
operation of the irrigation sector (Lam, 2004).  Yet the sector as a whole has 
shown resilience to adapt to the change, and more importantly, to resist 
attempts of the central government to exert control.  Unlike in other East 
Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea where the decline of 
agriculture has been accompanied by the nationalization of irrigation 
institutions, the irrigation sector of Taiwan is moving towards even higher 
degrees of self-governance and autonomy.   
The evolution of Taiwan’s irrigation systems in the last decades has 
shown a high degree of resilience.5  While the decline of agriculture has to a 
certain extent reduced farmers’ incentive to engage in agriculture and 
irrigation management, farmers and their irrigation institutions have been 
able to adapt to the new environment.  What is the dynamic of the process of 
adaptation?  What are the attributes of the system that enable it to adapt, and 
to transform itself into an even more resilient system?  Drawing upon the 
literature of complexity studies and conceptualizing an irrigation system as a 
socio-ecological system (SES), this paper seeks to understand the institutional 
vibrancy and resilience of Taiwanese irrigation.   
In the next section I shall first identify and discuss major changes in 
Taiwan’s political economy of agriculture and irrigation in the past decades.  
These changes present significant challenges to irrigation management, and 
have become the key parameters of the context in which irrigation institutions 
operate and evolve.  I shall then lay out the structure and dynamics of the 
irrigation system as a Social-Ecological System (SES), with particular reference 
to the specific features of Taiwanese irrigation.  I shall show that the basic 
design of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions, as a result of years of trial and error, 
has been able to cope with the dynamics inherent in the SES.  The design 
allows various actors and organizations at different levels to engage in 
continuous learning and adaptation.  I shall also discuss and examine how 
 4 
the macro disturbances have impact on Taiwan’s irrigation, and how the 
system adapted and evolved in response to the changes.  
 
The Political Economy of Irrigation in Taiwan: Disturbances and Challenges 
 
One can easily find in any standard economics textbooks the model of 
economic development in a market economy.  The model goes like this—as a 
market economy develops, agriculture will lose its comparative advantage 
vis-à-vis industrial and tertiary production.  The change in relative values 
will generate incentives for economic actors to make adjustments in resource 
allocation; investment will flow from agriculture to more profitable activities.  
Very often a caveat is made, saying that such an adjustment process in the 
real world may not be as smooth as portrayed in the model.  There are 
instances in which economic actors adjust badly, and are simply incapable or 
unwilling to make adjustments.  Despite that, the general dynamic is that 
agriculture will be replaced by other economic activities until the marginal 
benefit of agriculture comes at par with that of other economic activities. 
The trajectory of Taiwan’s economic development is very different from 
the textbook model, however, largely due to the active role played by the 
Taiwanese government in steering the economic development process in the 
country (Amsden, 1988; Kuo and Liu, 1999; Liao, Huang, & Hsiao, 1986; 
Moore, 1993; Wade, 1990).  In the 1950s and the 1960s, the government 
adopted policies to tax the agricultural sector to help launch industrialization.  
By a series of exploitative measures such as barter of fertilizer for rice and 
compulsory rice purchases, the government was able to extract surplus out of 
agriculture to support industrialization by providing affordable food and 
necessary financial transfers to the industrial sector.  By the late 1970s, 
Taiwan’s industry took off.  Agriculture lost out in the process.  Ironically, 
the efficiency of the agriculture sector (given a labor intensive mode of 
production) has made the sector particularly vulnerable to the process of 
industrialization.  Taiwan’s agriculture is dominated by paddy rice.  The 
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overproduction of paddy rice in Taiwan and worldwide, together with the 
decreasing demand for staple as a result of economic development, has put 
tremendous pressure on grain prices (Pingali et. al., 1997; Wu Huang, 1993).  
Since 1990, agriculture has accounted for less than 3% of the country’s GDP. 
While agriculture lost its economic viability, the kind of cross-sector 
reallocation of resources as described in standard economics texts did not 
occur in Taiwan.  Understanding Taiwan’s agriculture policy requires that 
one put the issue in the larger context of the country’s political economy.  
Ever since its inception, the government in Taiwan has always been in a 
dormant but confronting relationship with the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC).  While Taiwanese government maintains that Taiwan is an 
independent political entity, the PRC considers it a renegade province to be 
united with the motherland.  From the perspective of the Taiwanese 
government, a war across the Taiwan Strait is not only plausible but 
inevitable.  National security has been a paramount concern that comes 
above other policy considerations (AERC, 1999, 2000; Williams, 1994).  An 
implication is that food security is a key policy imperative underlying the 
formulation of agriculture policy in the country.  To maintain food security, 
the Taiwanese government maintains a grain reserve that is sufficient for the 
consumption of the island’s population for about a year.  More importantly, 
the government is determined to ensure that the agricultural potential be 
preserved, so that Taiwan has the ability to feed its population in case of 
embargoes.  To maintain the agricultural potential, the government has 
promulgated strict zoning laws, restricting changes of land use of paddy 
fields.  To compensate the farmers, the government has provided a variety of 
subsidy programs, including guaranteed procurement of grains at 
preferential prices, subsidies for fallowing, and substantial rural 
infrastructure projects.  As the vibrancy of irrigation infrastructure is 
essential to the maintenance of agricultural potential, the government has 
been subsidizing the irrigation sector quite substantially.6 
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Other than the food security concern, another aspect of the political 
economy of agricultural policy in Taiwan concerns with votes and elections.  
The rural populace in Taiwan constitutes a substantial voting block that no 
political parties in the country could afford to ignore.  As of 2002, the 17 IAs 
in Taiwan have a total membership of more than 1.2 million (TJIA, 2003).  
Assuming that each member household has four people eligible to vote, the 
IAs can influence almost 5 million votes.  Unlike in many other Asian 
countries, Taiwan’s rural populace is highly organized, an unintended 
consequence of the government’s effort to control the rural population 
through a network of semi-governmental organizations, including the IAs 
(Foster, 2001).  When the interest of these organized groups is challenged, 
they won’t hesitate to defend themselves.7 
The government’s food and agricultural policies would not have affected 
agriculture too adversely had the agricultural sector been able to diversify 
production.  Unfortunately, the structure of Taiwan’s agriculture is not 
conducive to diversification or change.  A major structural problem is the 
small landholding size, which is largely a result of the land reforms so 
successfully implemented in the early 1950s.  Since 1990, the average 
landholding size of farm households in Taiwan has been less than 1 hectare.8  
The small landholding size does not allow effective use of machines and, 
more importantly, renders infrastructure investment uneconomical.  Farmers 
simply cannot make a living on farming.9  As farming turns unprofitable, 
farmers in other countries might well sell their farmlands and move to cities.  
Taiwanese farmers, however, are generally unwilling to do so.  Farmers’ 
bond of land might explain part of the situation, but material incentive might 
be a more important factor.  Many farmers expect that some day their lands 
might be rezoned, which would mean a substantial increase in land value.  
For farmers who derive a major part of income from non-farm activities, they 
could afford keeping the lands and wait. 
 The political economy of agriculture as described has impact on irrigation 
management at two levels.  At the field level, farmers face little incentive to 
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engage in irrigation management.  Unlike in good old days when irrigation 
water very much determined farmers’ income, and so farmers had strong 
incentives to get involved in irrigation operation and maintenance (O&M), 
farming nowadays is considered a supplementary economic activity which, in 
some circumstances, is not even for profit-making but simply for keeping the 
lands cultivable.  Such a low-incentive mode of agriculture poses serious 
challenges to Taiwanese irrigation management which is grounded upon 
farmers’ participation and farmer-government synergy. 
 At the sectoral level, the change has posed to the government the difficult 
question of how to restructure its relationship with the irrigation sector.  
Given that farmers are trapped in agriculture by government policies and do 
not have much incentive to invest in irrigation maintenance and operation, 
the government finds itself taking on an increasingly heavy role in irrigation 
management (AERC/IIMI, 1997; Chen, 1997; TJIA, 1992, 2003).  Since 1993, 
the government has been paying membership fees to the IAs on farmers’ 
behalf, in addition to the large infrastructure maintenance subsidy that also 
comes out of the government budget.  As the irrigation sector is getting more 
and more reliant on government subsidy, the government feels obliged to 
impose tighter control to make sure that public monies are appropriately 
spent.  Interestingly, that the government has put in increasing amounts of 
resources in the irrigation sector does not mean that all the IAs are facing 
financial difficulties.  The IAs that are located near urban areas have in fact 
been accumulating much wealth through the sales of lands and properties 
that ceased to serve irrigation purposes (AERC, 2001).  Because farmers are 
no longer enthusiastic about getting involved in irrigation management and 
hence the operation of the IAs, the government finds herself taking on the role 
of the monitor to prevent the IAs from turning into some private clubs of IA 
staffs and local politicians who control the IAs. 
 Despite the government’s intention to tighten control, putting effective 
control in place is no easy task (CAEA, 1995).  First, the IAs are formed and 
owned by farmers.  It is not clear as to how the government could square the 
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concept of private property with the process of nationalizing the IAs.  Second, 
how to manage the IA staff is another thorny issue.  Currently the IA staff do 
not have the civil servant status; in fact, the majority of the older generations 
of the staff have received only limited formal education.  Third, the IAs are 
important political mobilization machines.  Politicians who have a strong 
hold in these organizations are unlikely to give in easily. 
 Another dimension of the challenge at the sectoral level is concerned 
about water resource allocation and utilization across sectors.  As agriculture 
is no longer a major economic activity, many people argue that water rights 
should be reconsidered so that more water could be diverted to domestic and 
industrial uses.  To irrigation officials and the IAs, they need to address two 
issues.  First, they need to provide justifications for their defense of their 
water rights.  Second, they need to come up with policy recommendations 
that allow effective utilization and flexible allocation of water across sectors. 
 The challenges at both the operational and sectoral levels have impact on 
the operation and management of irrigation systems in Taiwan.  To 
understand how the Taiwanese irrigation systems have responded to these 
challenges, and how their responses have constituted and affected the 
dynamics of the evolution of irrigation institutions, I shall draw upon the 
literature on complexity studies and social-ecological systems to highlight the 
dynamics involved and how the systems have coped with the dynamics.   
 
Irrigation System as a Social-Ecological System 
 
An irrigation system can be conceptualized as a complex social-ecological 
system (SES) in which human agents in different capacities and of different 
attributes engage in continuous interaction in response to one another and the 
biophysical environment (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2003; Berkes & Folke, 
1998; Berkes, Colding, & Folke, 2003).  Interactions among human agents can 
give rise to emergent aggregate pattern and hence systemic attributes that 
determine the system’s ability to adapt to the turbulent environment.  Unlike 
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other complex systems that do not involve humans, the potentials of human 
cogitation and strategic thinking further increase the level of complexity 
involved in a SES.  A SES is complex, epistemic, hierarchic, and dynamic. 
 
A Complex System 
A complex system is constituted by a large number of autonomous units 
which constantly interact with one another, as well as the environment of 
which they are parts.  In other words, a complex system has the process of 
self-organization built in.  “Self-organization is a process in which pattern at 
the global level of a system emerges solely from numerous interactions 
among the lower-level components of the system.  Moreover, the rules 
specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed using 
only local information, without reference to the global pattern” (Camazine, 
et.al., 2001).  A complex system is complex not because it involves a large 
number of units or rules; instead, complexity pertains to the emerging 
systemic patterns or properties that are not present at the unit level. 
In a complex system, the process of aggregation of the behavior of 
individual units into systemic behavior is often non-linear and combinatorial, 
and hence non-trivial and hard to make point predictions.  Trivial changes at 
the individual level could trigger off chains of effects leading to substantive 
transformation at the systemic level, a phenomenon called parameter turning 
(Janssen, 2002; Lansing, 2002; Waldrop, 1992).10  A particular move of a unit 
could result in either benign or malign systemic effects, depending on how 
other actors respond and on the kind of cascading effects that it triggers.   In 
other words, the properties of a system cannot be understood as the simple 
addition of individual contributions by the system’s components.  A complex 
system is dynamic in that the emergent features of the system require 
continual interactions among the system’s components.  A complex system is 
always in flux, yet the on-going interaction of the units generates dynamic 
patterns, from which systemic characters emerge (Johnson, 2001). 
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Saying that a complex system is one of order amid chaos does not mean 
that its aggregate patterns remain unchanged.  On the contrary, the 
mechanisms that govern the interactions among individuals also evolve in 
response to the environment (Kauffman, 1995).  Such a selection process 
allows the system as a whole to adapt to the changing context.  In a SES, 
particularly, human creativity and the diversity of institutions and rules are 
able to generate a large number of alternative mechanisms in the process of 
trial and error. 
An irrigation system is a complex system of which irrigation 
performance is the emergent quality constituted by numerous decisions and 
actions of actors of different capacities in disparate situations.  A 
well-performed irrigation system is characterized not only by 
well-maintained infrastructure, but more importantly a productive working 
order of farmers (as resource users) and irrigation management staff (as 
infrastructure providers).  Such a productive working order is an emergent 
pattern that is not the outcome of the command of a central pacemaker.   
Water in a system flows from the head end to the tail end through a 
network of canals.  The flow nature of water implies a high degree of 
interdependence among individuals involved in the processes of 
appropriation and management (Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Lam, 1998).  
While the task of irrigation management involves much interdependence, 
decisions by individuals as to what to do and how to do in a particular 
situation are often highly independent.  For instance, a farmer at the head 
end who tries to stop the water in a canal a little longer in order to divert a 
little more water to his fields would unlikely be able to comprehend how his 
seemingly trivial and innocent act might affect the operation of the system as 
a whole.  From the perspective of the farmer, the interdependence is highly 
invisible and incomprehensible.   
The challenge of coordination in such a complex and uncertain setting is 
substantial.  It goes beyond the social dilemma portrayed by the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma Game, which has often been by scholars to understand the collective 
 11 
action problem involved in common pool resource management (Ostrom, 
Gardner, & Walker, 1994).  Instead of a matter of strategic calculation, the 
problem here is how to coordinate a large number of decisions in such a 
situation where the link between individual actions and aggregate outcome is 
highly complex and uncertain (Lansing, 1991).  Also given the nonlinear 
dynamics and the possibility of parameter turning, some mechanisms have to 
be in place that identify and counteract cascading negative feedbacks, and 
facilitate positive feedbacks (Arthur, 1994).  Finally, in a complex system, the 
adaptability of the system is an emergent pattern of the responses of 
individual to the changing environment.  The mechanisms that are able to 
translate individual adaptations into systemic adaptation determine the 
resilience of the SES. 
 
An Epistemic System 
A major feature of a SES as a specific type of complex systems is its 
human and hence epistemic dimension.  Unlike in many other complex 
systems where the autonomous units passively respond to others and the 
environment, a SES is activated by human beings who have the abilities to (1) 
think and foresee action-outcome links, (2) acquire and appreciate value and 
meaning of action, and (3) learn and conduct trial-and-error.  The epistemic 
nature of the SES opens up opportunities for development and innovation, 
but at the same time generates a great deal of uncertainty and complexity.  
Understanding the design and operation of the SES requires that one pay 
serious attention to human cognition, and how it is reflected in the social, and 
even physical, infrastructure used by human beings in problem solving.  
Human beings are boundedly rational.  Fallible individuals in a complex 
system find themselves in a continuous process of making sense of the 
situation in which they find themselves, and develop strategies to make the 
best out of the situation.  The architecture of human cognition, then, takes on 
an important role in understanding human choice and action (Jones, 2001, 
2002, 2003; Simon, 1981, 1985).  Individuals develop mental models to frame 
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the world as they see it.  The mental models help individuals make sense of 
the world by (1) stipulating the definition of the problem in hand, (2) 
constituting individual preferences (what should be wanted), (3) laying out 
causal action-outcome relationships, and hence possible alternative courses of 
action, (4) specifying criteria for the choice of the appropriate alternatives.  
Note that the perfectly rational model of man used by economists and rational 
choice theorists can be considered to be a particular type of model in which 
individuals have a rather clear idea about the problem situation.  In other 
words, even rational choice is embedded in the prior and broader question of 
how the mental model is built at the first place.  In a complex situation, 
rationality cannot be assumed but has to be explained (Jones, 2003). 
Several characteristics of mental model building are noteworthy.  First, 
mental models are rooted in genetic and cultural heritage of a community.  
Social scientists have found that human beings’ abilities of empathy and of 
engaging in reciprocal interaction provide themselves with the potential for 
developing mental models for mutual betterment (Ostrom & Janssen, 2002).  
The viability and validity of a particular mental model depends on whether it 
is shared among, and understood by, individuals in a community.  In other 
words, mental models are embedded in the broader cultural and social 
understanding of a community of individuals, who share common 
experiences and predispositions of action (North, 1990). 
Second, once a mental model is adopted, it has the advantage of 
economizing cognitive capacity for individuals by identifying the essence of a 
problem situation and focusing individuals’ attention.  Yet a mental model is 
a two-edged sword.  While it simplifies, it also confines individuals’ vision.  
Problems arise when a mental model no longer captures the essence of a 
problem as the problem evolves.  Mental models are sticky, and inevitably 
with biases built in.  How to strike a balance between stability and change 
affects the viability of individuals’ adaptive efforts (Denzau & North, 1994). 
Third, human beings are endowed with the ability to imagine and to 
come up with new ways of looking at their circumstances.  In particular, 
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political scientists have argued convincingly that individuals facing social 
dilemmas, in which individuals’ short-term interest is not consistent with 
collective aggregate interest, are able to design rules and working 
relationships to change the situation in which they find themselves (Ostrom, 
1990, 1992).  So mental models are constantly tested and challenged.  When 
enough evidence about the inadequacy of a particular model is accumulated, 
the mental model currently in use could be replaced.   
Fourth, mental models are constituted by a set of associations (between 
concepts and empirical referent, and between causes and consequences) 
accumulated as individuals learn through their experiences of problem 
solving and interaction (Arthur, 1991; V. Ostrom, 1997).  It means that mental 
models are always embedded in experiences in particular contexts, and 
underlined by the learning process.  Individuals possess a repertoire of 
potential metaphors and beliefs, which constitute the building blocks for 
mental models.  
The specific features of human cognition have serious implications for the 
study of irrigation institutions in Taiwan.  First, prior studies have shown 
that the success of Taiwan’s irrigation management hinges upon a large array 
of diverse local institutions developed by farmers in disparate local 
communities to cope with irrigation problems that are location-specific and 
time-specific.  As Denzau and North (1994) argue, institutions are simply 
mental models externalized.  What are the mental models in the repertoire 
that have been drawn upon by the farmers in the coping with the macro 
disturbances?  Are there commonalities across these models that explain 
their adaptive capacity?  Second, the design of the mechanisms that help 
generate and maintain such a diverse repertoire of mental models is 
instrumental to the resilience of the system.  What are these mechanisms and 
how do they work?  Have the macro political economic disturbances impact 
on these mechanisms?  Third, a mental model is effective only if it is shared 
and commonly understood by a community of individuals.  What is it in the 
Taiwanese system that makes the shared learning possible?  How does the 
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shared learning process and capacity affect farmers’ adaptation to the 
changing environment?   
 
A Hierarchic System 
Simon (1962) defines a hierarchic system as one “that is composed of 
interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn, hierarchic in 
structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem.”  In 
irrigation, for instance, a river system is often composed of several smaller 
river valley systems, and each of the river valley systems is in turn 
decomposed into branches, laterals, and sub-laterals.  Each of the smaller 
systems at a particular level is to a certain extent self-contained, yet is 
somehow related to a larger system.   
A hierarchic system usually comprises of sub-systems that operate 
coherently, yet are nested within one another.  Different tasks involved in a 
system might be of various scales in terms of scope and time (Ostrom & 
Janssen, 2002).  The difference in scales could be both horizontal, in that 
activities of scales overlapped with one another at different levels, and 
vertical, in that some activities in a system constitute self-contained 
subsystems.  Such polycentric feature is particularly conspicuous in 
irrigation management that involves multiple tasks of various scales.  
Farmers sharing waters from a branch canal develop an order of water 
distribution and appropriation.  Such a local irrigation order is in turn 
sustained by the larger concerns of managing the main canal and 
coordinating the distribution of water among branches.  The management of 
the physical infrastructure in turn is conditioned by the concerns of how 
irrigation management relates to the broader issues of water resource 
management and economic development; and these issues are often managed 
in the context of national governance.  
Several features of the multi-scale character of a hierarchic system are 
particularly important.  First, structures and processes of different scales on 
different levels tend to have very different spatial and temporal attributes.  
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Irrigation systems at the tail end of a large channel could be operated on a 
cycle very different from those at the head end, and even more different from 
the operation pattern of the larger channel.  Also the fields at the tail end 
near coastal areas are more sensitive to the problem of salinity than the fields 
at the head end.  The operation of the SES involves institutional 
arrangements of multiple scales, each with different design imperatives.  
Second, structures and processes at different levels tend to affect one another.  
Usually the slower, larger levels constrain the behavior of faster and lower 
levels (Gunderson & Pritchard, 2002).  The operation of the channel that 
delivers water from a reservoir to laterals is likely to affect the operation of 
the systems that receive water from the laterals.  Also the resilience of one 
level does not necessarily enhance the resilience of another level.  Systems 
that keep absorbing shocks at the local level tend to numb the vigilance of the 
larger system; when the physical structure of the larger system gets to a point 
of no return, the damage could be disastrous.  The synchronization of 
processes at different levels is of major importance.   
In the institutional domain, the hierarchic nature is manifested in 
organizations, or regimes, that operate at several levels.  The regimes at 
multiple levels deal with problems of different sizes and scales, and have 
jurisdictions over a multitude of policy communities.  Two dimensions of the 
multiplicity are noteworthy.  First, while the boundaries or jurisdictions of 
various regimes are usually somehow correspondent to the scales of various 
biophysical processes and structures, they are not necessarily so.  In 
irrigation in many South Asian countries, for example, a unifying bureaucracy 
is in place to manage all the irrigation matters from the management of water 
source all the way to water delivery to farmers’ fields.  Obviously the 
assumption is that the large-scale bureaucracy is able to cope with the 
diversity embedded in various domains of collective action involved in 
irrigation management.  Research in irrigation, however, shows that the 
systems in which multiple regimes at different levels are in place to cope with 
problems of different scales are likely to be more efficient than those managed 
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by a unifying regime, or those systems in which regimes and processes are 
not matched appropriately (Ostrom 1992; Lam 1998).   
Second, although regimes at different levels are hierarchic and somehow 
related to one another, they are not necessarily closely-linked.  The issue 
involved here is the dilemma between coordination and autonomy.  On the 
one hand, a hierarchic system could be decomposed into processes and 
structures that are self-contained enough for easy problem solving; regimes 
should be put in place at different levels to address these structures and 
processes.  On the other hand, while decomposable, the structure and 
processes are necessarily related to one another, frequently in a non-linear 
manner; that, in fact, is what makes these structures and processes one system.  
Coordination then becomes essential.  Being able to strike the balance 
between autonomy and coordination affects the viability of the system.  In 
irrigation, for example, O&M is best left to farmers’ organizations at the 
sub-lateral level, where time-specific and place-specific local information is 
readily available.  Yet these local organizations would need to coordinate 
with one another when water in the main channel has become scarce.  Under 
those situations, the preferences of the local organizations might not be 
consistent with one another.  The dilemma between autonomy and 
coordination underlies the problem of nesting of regimes at multiple levels. 
 
A Dynamic Problem-Solving System 
Disturbance can be understood as a series of events that could possible 
disrupts the structure and processes of a SES (Janssen, Anderies, & Ostrom, 
2003).  Understanding the nature of the disturbance regime is important not 
only because they could pose as challenges to the SES; but more importantly 
they are part of the SES.  A SES, like any other complex system, is not a static 
mix of variables, but a dynamic system composed of a complex set of 
on-going relationships among human actors and between human actors and 
the biophysical world.  An irrigation system is not recognizable by its 
infrastructure or members, but the ways members interact with one another 
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in an effort to utilize the infrastructure to attain some human purposes.  
Disturbances provide the driving force for the operation of the structures and 
processes of a SES.  As Waldrop (1992) puts it, “a complex system is always 
in the process of attaining stability amid chaos”. 
Nature could impose not only risk but also uncertainty (unknown) 
(Simon, 1981) and ambiguity (different interpretations) (Axelrod, 2003).  A 
disturbance regime could be described by various attributes, such as severity 
and frequency.  Disturbance could be originated from within the SES or 
without from the environment (Janssen, Anderies, & Ostrom, 2003).  Yet all 
disturbances manifest their effects through impinging upon the elements, and 
the relationships between the elements, in a system.  Conceptualizing 
disturbance as an inherent component of a SES, two dimensions are of 
particular importance to understanding the resilience of the SES.  The first is 
the degree of predictability.  Predictability is concerned with the problem of 
risk.  A cyclical phenomenon, such as drought cycles, is more predictable and 
could be taken into account in advance.  A more haphazard phenomenon, 
such as a landslide is more unpredictable and could let people off guarded.  
So individuals have a better understanding of the probability of predictable 
events than that of unpredictable events.  Yet regardless the degree of 
predictability, both types of disturbances are foreseeable.  People know that 
they are forthcoming, but just don’t know when and where. 
There is yet another type of disturbances that defy ex ante prediction.  
These disturbances are unforeseeable, in that people have only very rough 
ideas about the existence of these disturbances, or the form they take (Axelrod, 
2003).  Facing these unforeseeable disturbances, uncertainty prevents 
individuals from estimating the probability function of these disturbances.  
In irrigation management, the impact of economic development belongs to 
the type of unforeseeable disturbances.  While both farmers and irrigation 
officials know that economic development is going to affect how irrigation is 
managed, exactly how the impact is going to be like is unclear.  Uncertainty 
is particularly serious when disturbances take the form of diffused creeping 
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changes.  Farmers might be aware that their neighbors are increasingly less 
concerned about the conditions of the canals and less willing to cooperate.  
Yet they cannot tell exactly why and how that happened, and when it began.  
Disturbance from politics is another example of unforeseeable disturbance.  
While everybody knows that politics affects irrigation management, exactly 
what form politics takes in particular circumstances cannot be easily foreseen.  
It would be difficult for individuals, or the system, to develop strategies ex 
ante to cope with political disturbances.   
  
Coping with Complexity: 
Institutional Design, Resilience, and Adaptation in Taiwanese Irrigation 
 
To attain a productive working order in irrigation requires that the 
dynamics embedded in the complex system be harnessed effectively (Axelrod 
& Cohen, 2000).  The design of Taiwanese irrigation institutions has, to a 
large extent, allowed the irrigation systems to cope with such dynamics.  
External disturbances create perturbations, which might in turn impact on the 
operation of the system.  In the process of adapting to the perturbations, the 
institutions themselves are subject to challenges, and hence evolve.  The 
viability of the adaptation and evolution affects the resilience of the system.  
With reference to the dynamics of the SES identified, I shall in the following 
examine how the Taiwanese irrigation systems deal with the tasks of 
coordination, repertoire building, and nesting. 
 
Coordination  
A major feature of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions is that they provide 
arenas and logistic support for problem solving by farmers at the field level.11  
Farmers are organized into self-organized Irrigation Groups (IGs), which are 
responsible for irrigation operation and maintenance (O&M) in the field.  
Farmers in an IG elect an IG leader, who is given the mandate to coordinate 
and liaise with the IG members concerning O&M activities. In some IGs, 
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water guards are hired to help on water allocation and minor maintenance 
works.  A major feature of the IGs is that they are organized on the basis of 
hydraulic boundaries.  In Taoyuan areas where a large number of ponds 
were in place for water storage, for example, the IGs there are organized in 
accordance with the areas irrigated by individual ponds.  In areas irrigated 
by water from reservoirs such as the Chianan areas, an IG usually includes 
irrigators served by the same sub-lateral.  By matching the boundaries of the 
IGs with hydraulic areas, the task of irrigation management is effectively 
compartmentalized into subtasks; more importantly, farmers in each IG are in 
effect assigned to coordinate among themselves with reference to the 
management of the subtask.  That farmers at the local level are allowed to 
work out solutions to cope with the “localized” irrigation problems enables 
better utilization of local information.  The IG arrangements, by nature of its 
proximity to local community, can effectively draw upon social capital that 
has already been developed in local community to attain coordination in the 
O&M processes (Lam, 1996a). 
Coordination at the sub-lateral level with the IG as the basic 
problem-solving unit by itself is inadequate.  While the IG arrangement 
enhances clustering among farmers in particular hydraulic areas, how 
disparate IGs can connect with one another affects the overall performance of 
the system as a whole.  Closely knitted communities provide solid 
foundation for collective problem solving, by themselves alone they are 
fragile in dealing with external shocks or changes of a large-scale, and their 
activities might not be consistent with one another in pursuing larger-scale 
collective actions (Buchanan 2002; Watts, 2003).  Research on the so-called 
small world phenomena provides very good insights for understanding the 
institutional design reconciling clustering and connect-ness.  A major finding 
of the research is that allowing a small number of random links developed 
between individuals can provide the glue that drastically shortens the social 
distance between individuals belonging to different communities.  These 
random links do not have to be strong; the mere existence of these links 
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serves a miraculous function of linking up closely-knitted communities.  In 
irrigation management, cross-community coordination is of utmost 
importance to irrigation efficiency.  
In Taiwan, two institutional arrangements are in place to connect the 
clustered groups (the IGs).  The first is the irrigation plans worked out by 
Irrigation Associations (IAs) every year as the blueprint for water delivery.  
The plans are made mainly based upon the geological and topographical 
conditions of farmers’ fields and expected cropping patterns, with minor 
adjustments made every year to take into account the changes in the size of 
irrigated areas and possible changes in land use.  While the plans are so 
meticulous that even the exact amount of water allocated to a particular patch 
is specified, they are frequently not strictly followed in actual water 
distribution.  In fact in systems where the major source of water is rivers and 
creeks, irrigation plans are made but seldom used.  Yet these irrigation plans 
do serve a very important coordination function.  The amounts of water to 
particular field as specified in these plans are considered farmers’ entitlement 
of water.  They serve as the yardstick around which adjustments be made.  
So disparate IGs have a rough idea about the overall picture of how water 
should be distributed, which could impose the bounds within which the IGs 
can make mutual adjustments.  In a way these plans provide a mental map 
for farmers to engage in mutual adjustments.  
Second, random links are put in place that provide bridges linking up the 
IGs and the working stations.  The working stations hold regular IG leaders 
meetings twice a year, usually scheduled for the time right before irrigation 
starts.  Other than these regular meetings, ad hoc meetings will be held to 
cope with emergencies.  Whether these meetings can provide an effective 
arena for decision making and deliberation has been subject to question.  
Anyone who has observed these meetings would note that they are more like 
social gatherings and largely dominated by IA officials.  Very often the 
attendance rate is low.  Despite that, these meetings serve the important 
function of weak ties linking up the IGs.  As suggested by the literature of 
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network, the ties linking up clustered groups do not have to be very strong.  
The major function of these weak ties is to (1) shorten the social distance 
between clustered groups so as to enhance coordination and (2) provide 
access to learning from one another (Watts, 1999, 2003).  A farmer put it 
succinctly, “People attend these meetings just to know what is going on with 
one another; if I encounter problems of importance, I would definitely contact 
the workings station chief direct.  These meetings are not supposed to be an 
arena for problem solving.”  Other than meetings, IG leaders are engaged in 
activities of various kinds organized by the IAs.  For example, every year an 
irrigation festival is organized at which some “model IG leaders” will be 
given awards; also an IG leader is entitled to an “overseas field trip” during 
his term of service to broaden his horizons.  All these seemingly trivial and 
irrelevant activities help sustain the connect-ness among the IG leaders. 
Random links are also built in by rotating working station staffs every 
now and then.  A major characteristic of the IAs is that, through a network of 
working stations, the IA staffs are stationed in the field for a relatively long 
period of time so that they are made embedded in the communities they serve 
(Lam, 1996a).  Again, embeddedness enhances clustered-ness, yet linking up 
clustered groups requires that random links be put in place to shorten social 
distance.  Working station staff are posted to different working stations in 
their careers.  Yet unlike in South Asian countries where irrigation officials 
are often posted to particular positions for a short period of time, IA staff 
usually spend a prolonged period of time in a station.  The prolonged stay, 
however, is not like that in Japan where the small size of Farmland 
Improvement Associations has basically locked in irrigation staff to a 
particular locale for their careers.  The IA staff usually have a number of 
postings during their careers.  The infrequent yet regular movement of staff 
helps creating links between officials and farmers across communities. 
The “official version” of Taiwanese irrigation management that every 
detail in water delivery is under control is, at best, misleading.  Coordination 
in actual water delivery in Taiwan is maintained not by a grand plan or a 
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pacemaker, but by an array of institutional arrangements that encourage local 
problem solving on one hand, and local mutual adjustments on the other.  
While such a mode of coordination seems not forceful, and certainly does not 
fit neatly with the engineering image of orderly water allocation, it is 
tremendously flexible and robust.  It allows farmers in disparate situations to 
decide on how much effort they want to put in irrigation management, and 
their best ways to do it.   
The situation in Chianan provides a good illustrating case.  In Chianan 
areas, irrigation water mainly comes from large reservoirs; rotational 
irrigation is practiced.  The changing economic setting has triggered the 
development of a large array of institutions to cope with the impact of macro 
economic changes in disparate locations.  Farmers in different locations along 
the canal would assess the profitability of farming (based upon their 
knowledge on the cropping patterns of their fields and the market situation), 
and work out very different water allocation practices that require different 
levels of involvements and input on their part.  In areas where two crops a 
year is possible, an irrigation slip system, in which farmers will get the 
amount of water specified by irrigation slips distributed by the working 
stations, is adopted.  Under the irrigation slip system, farmers need to get to 
the field to see to it water is actually delivered, and the irrigation plan is 
strictly complied.  In areas where a three years two crops pattern is adopted 
(where farmers are allowed to grow the second crop twice in three years), a 
responsibility system is developed in which the water guards hired by the IAs 
have full discretion in water allocation.  Under the responsibility system, 
farmers’ input is minimal.  Interestingly at the tail end areas closed to the 
seashore where salinity problem is serious and productivity is low, the 
irrigation slip system is adopted.  The general pattern is that farmers’ input 
and agricultural productivity (or profitability of farming) are in a U-shape 
relationship.  Farmers’ input is high when farming is profitable, and the 
input decreases with the decrease of profitability; yet at the worst scenario 
where the survival of the fields is at stake, farmers are willing to do more.  
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Local institutions have been adjusted to reflect and cope with such a dynamic.  
The flexibility of the institutions can cope with the low incentive mode of 
agriculture on one hand, and retain a certain level of vibrancy in irrigation 
management on the other. 
The viability of the flexible institutional arrangements in Taiwan depends 
on the willingness of a small group of IG leaders who serve as the bridges 
connecting up farmers.  The IAs are surely aware of the situation, and have 
adopted measures to beef up the support and incentives for the IG leaders.  
In Taoyuan IA, for example, IG leaders are allowed to operate aquaculture in 
the ponds that store irrigation water for the IGs.  In Chianan, the IA provides 
an operational budget for each IG.  Other than material incentives, the 
connective-ness of the IG leaders is also strengthened.  For instance, in some 
areas, the IG leaders are organized into associations.  In Taoyuan, each 
managerial staff is required to visit the working stations at least twice a year.  
Although many IGs are no longer as active as before, the role of the IG leaders 
has become increasingly important for the purpose of coordination. 
 
Repertoire Building and Learning 
As discussed above, boundedly rational individuals make sense of the 
world by resorting to shared mental models that provide the assumptions and 
theories explaining the world.  The fallible individuals, however, would not 
know for sure ex ante which mental models are appropriate for particular 
situations.  A robust SES should allow for the generation and maintenance of 
a variety of mental models that could possibly be drawn upon for various 
problem situations.   
A robust SES should possess two types of coping capacities in dealing 
with disturbance (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  For foreseeable disturbance, 
a repertoire should be developed so that an appropriate coping strategy is 
matched with the disturbance at the right time.  In terms of institutional 
design, a major concern is that the strategies in the repertoire should be 
comprehensive enough to provide readily available action plans for possible 
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scenarios on one hand, and should not be too exclusive to preclude the 
possibilities of taking into unique and new scenarios into account on the other.  
Another design concern is to improve the predictability of disturbances by 
utilizing local information and strengthening the information process capacity 
of the system.  Coping with unforeseeable disturbances is more challenging.  
Given that little information is available, the institutional design concern is 
not about strengthening the contents of the repertoire per se, but improving 
the process of search for viable models and alternatives.   
A major characteristic of Taiwanese irrigation is that it is a 
knowledge-rich system.  As mentioned above, farmers in disparate locations 
are allowed to develop appropriate local institutions to cope with their local 
problems.  Other than the autonomy to develop local institutions, an even 
more important feature is that the knowledge generated is systematically 
recorded.  When I visited the Kung Wen working station in Chianan where 
the physical condition is hostile and the problem of salinity is serious, I was 
shown a pile of irrigation plans worked out by the local staff of the working 
station that have been used to “supplement” the formal irrigation plan 
promulgated by the Chianan IA.  The IA headquarters staff of course were 
quick to discard these locally-made plans as rudimentary; yet it is the local 
knowledge embodied in these meticulous locally-made plans and the like that 
has enabled Taiwanese farmers and the irrigation systems to cope with 
diverse problems.  Meticulously recording knowledge is not confined to local 
levels, but is regularly done at different jurisdiction levels of the irrigation 
sector.  Anyone who visits the IAs will likely be shown the detailed 
handbooks that document management measures and practices for various 
contingencies.  In fact, even the irrigation authorities in the central 
government have been doing likewise, compiling handbooks on very aspect 
of irrigation management.   
These handbooks of course do not necessarily provide the solution to 
every problem; yet the knowledge recorded does constitute a repertoire of 
ideas that provides the building blocks for working out mental models.  The 
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practice of water stoppage during droughts is a case in point.  The basic idea, 
as recorded in the handbook, is that prolonging the irrigation cycle by a few 
days could reduce water use without doing harm to the crops.  Yet exactly 
how long the water should be stopped, how water stoppage can fit in 
irrigation rotation, and how water stoppage should be managed would all 
depend on the physical as well as institutional setting of particular systems.  
During my fieldwork, I found a variety of water stoppage rules used in 
different IGs.  More interestingly, perhaps due to the close networks of the 
IGs, there is a high degree of cross-community learning.  Farmers in an IG 
often draw upon the experiences of their counterparts in other IGs in 
developing strategies and techniques to deal with different contingencies.  It 
is noteworthy that the cross-community learning is not confined to irrigation 
matters, but pertains to farming matters in general.12   
Mental models are not only concerned about the physical and operational 
dimensions of irrigation management; broader issues such as the orientation 
of the irrigation sector in general are also of major importance.  Unlike the 
typical irrigation agency in many other Asian countries, the Irrigation 
Associations in Taiwan are not merely engineering agencies.  As discussed 
above and elsewhere (Lam, 1996a), the IAs are parastatal organizations 
owned by farmers, staffed by professional engineers and managers, 
controlled by local politicians, and supported and supervised by the 
government.  In other words, due to their parastatal and association nature, 
the IAs include in their staffs a combination of engineers, managers, 
professional administrators and local politicians.  So unlike a typical 
irrigation agency, the IAs have the capacity to address irrigation management 
not only from the engineering perspective, but also from the social and policy 
perspectives.  Such capacity is particularly important in the context where 
not only the IAs but the whole irrigation sector has to find a niche to re-orient 
itself.  More importantly, incentives are built in so that various actors, 
particularly the politicians who control the IAs and the IA staffs, are eager to 
play the role of the policy entrepreneur.  So when the water rights of the IAs 
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were challenged by the industrial and domestic sectors, the IAs were quick to 
put the issue in the broader historical-social perspective, emphasizing that 
although rainfall may come from the sky, water in the canal is available only 
because generations of irrigation staff and farmers have put in tremendous 
management efforts.  When the IAs were asked to generate revenues to 
finance some of their activities, they could easily come up with innovative 
ideas such as partnering up with the power companies to piggyback on water 
flow for power generation. 
With the decline of agriculture and the increasing politicization of 
irrigation management, learning has become more confusing.  Sometimes 
farmers could get stuck in a model that may provide short-term benefits but 
cause long-term damage to their systems.  Perhaps the best example is the 
controversy concerning membership fees (Lam, 2004).  When irrigation is 
portrayed as merely one type of public services that the government should 
provide for free, farmers and irrigation staffs are getting more and more 
dependent; and tend to dwell on strategies that seek rent from the 
government.  Even the farmers agree that having the government to pay the 
membership fees on their behalf has changed their relationship with the IAs; 
yet the dependence model has become seemingly so self-evident that nobody 
is willing to challenge it.   
 
Nesting 
To cope with the multi-scale nature of irrigation management, irrigation 
institutions serving activities of different scales at different levels are nested 
within one another.  As mentioned, the IGs are organized around hydraulic 
(at sub-lateral level) and community boundaries; above the IGs are working 
stations that are organized to cover a number of IGs, in accordance with 
larger hydraulic boundaries (at lateral level).  In some larger IAs, a number 
of management stations are in place to take care of a number of working 
stations in a still larger hydraulic region.  The IA headquarters oversee the 
overall irrigation management in particular regions.  While each unit is given 
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the task and much autonomy in managing irrigation in a particular area, it is 
at the same time supported and covered by a higher-level unit that manages a 
task of a larger scale.  Institutions at different levels are nested within one 
another.  Unlike the typical irrigation bureaucracy that also emphasizes 
layers of units, the IGs and working stations in Taiwan enjoy high degrees of 
autonomy and discretion (Lam, 1996a; Moore, 1989).   
The nesting arrangements enhance complementarity and embeddedness 
(Lam, 1996a; Evans 1996).  By complementarity, I refer to the mutually 
beneficial division of labor among actors in different positions.  Tasks of 
different scales require quite different expertise and resources to deal with.  
For example, while the IGs might be able to help fix small leaks on canals, 
larger scale emergency maintenance works need to be dealt with by the 
working stations or even the headquarters.  By the same token, while the IGs 
might command good local information about the canals at the sub-lateral 
level, information about the water flow in the main channel will need to be 
collected by management stations.   
In terms of coping with coping with disturbances, complementarity 
serves the important function of keeping the system flexibly decomposable.  
Units could be easily re-grouped into units of different scales to cope with 
problems of different scopes.  Managing water allocation in droughts is a 
good case in point.  Depending on the scale and seriousness of the drought, 
rotation of different types involving working units of different scales could be 
adopted.  When water shortage is mild and considered temporary and 
short-term, rotation in the form of farmers within an irrigation block taking 
turns to receive water would suffice.  More serious water shortage might 
require that irrigation blocks take turns to receive water.  When droughts 
happen, rotation might be done on the basis of areas irrigated by laterals.  If 
the drought persists, rotation would be done on the basis of river systems.  
Complementarity also serves as the function of the safety valve that 
makes the system more resistant to external shocks.  The simplest form of 
safety valve is putting a certain degree of redundancy in place (Costanza, et. 
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al., 2001).  For example, instead of relying on the IG leaders to patrol the 
canals, the working staff will also do the patrolling.  Another form of safety 
valve is substitution.  As discussed elsewhere (Lam, 2004), one major strategy 
of the IAs to cope with the decreased incentive and input of farmers in 
irrigation management is to construct and maintain the infrastructure as well 
as possible so as to reduce the demand for farmer’s input.  Safety valve can 
also takes the form of the provision of buffer by larger units to smaller units, 
so that the smaller units can operate in a more stable setting.  Perhaps the 
most illustrative example of buffer is the option of fallowing provided by the 
government. The government and the IAs would make assessment of water 
availability before the planting season begins.  If water is judged to be scarce 
or droughts are expected, farmers can fallow their lands for the season with 
compensations from the government.  By absorbing part of risks of farmers, 
the option of fallowing in effect puts on bounds on the demand for irrigation 
management for the systems, and avoids extreme situations.  
Another example of buffer is concerned with the debate on water rights.  
In close cooperation of the agriculture and irrigation agencies in the central 
government, the IAs have been successful in defending the water rights 
assigned to irrigation.  Simple mathematics shows that fallowing, shrinking 
irrigated areas, and changing cropping patterns have all reduced the demand 
for irrigation water.  In practice, however, shrinking irrigated areas and more 
diversified cropping patterns could mean more scattered fields and more 
complicated irrigation schedules, and hence higher demand for irrigation 
water.  By insisting on retaining the water rights, the IAs in fact provide 
adequate cushion in terms of water availability for farmers and local 
irrigation staff to cope with the changing environment. 
Embeddedness refers to the intertwining of processes and institutions 
that helps create added value for the processes.  Embeddedness can enhance 
the operation and function of the processes.  For example, the IG leaders are 
the ones who enforce the order of water distribution at the field level.  
Usually the IG leaders are able to get farmers’ compliance through persuasion 
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and reconciliation.  Yet there are situations in which water is very scarce or 
serious feuds between farmers exist; the moral authority wielded by the IG 
leaders alone might not suffice for these situations.  The standard practice is 
that the staff from the working stations or even the IA headquarters will 
“accompany” the IG leaders to patrol the canals.  The presence of the IA staff 
surely enhances the legitimate authority of the IG leaders in discharging their 
duties.  Another example of embeddedness is the monitoring of IA staff.  
Through daily interaction, the farmers can effectively serve as the third-party 
monitor to supervise the IA staff at the working stations (Lam, 1996a; Moore, 
1989). 
Sometimes embeddedness operates in the form of units at a higher level 
controlling possible excesses by units at a lower level.  In Pingtung areas, the 
major source of water is groundwater.  Water delivery in the areas mainly 
involves the Pingtung IA providing electric pumps for farmers.  Water 
appropriation is highly individualistic; whenever the farmers need irrigation 
water, they can simply turn on the pumps to get whatever amount of water 
they want.  Given the large number of pumps, the individualistic nature of 
water appropriation, and the seeming abundance of groundwater, neither the 
farmers nor the IA have strong incentives to prevent water wastage.  It is 
commonplace that farmers just leave the pumps turned on, and let the water 
flow.  While the farmers and the IA do not care about water wastage, their 
over-appropriation of groundwater has already cause land subsidence in the 
coastal areas of Pingtung.  Instead of intervening direct, the central 
government has imposed a quota on the budget that can be spent on 
electricity for the pumps.  The quota in effect puts pressure on the IA to 
economize the use of pumps and hence the groundwater.  The outcome has 
been that the IA has installed meters to closely monitor the operation of the 
pumps, and worked out stricter plans. 
Embeddedness in terms of controlling excess has played a very important 
role in the relationship between the central government and the IAs.  As 
mentioned above, a major challenge facing Taiwan’s irrigation institutions has 
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been the changing nature of the IAs.  As farmers face little incentive to get 
involved in irrigation management and are getting increasingly detached, the 
IAs are becoming farmers’ organizations without farmers’ involvement.  A 
consequence is that the IA staff and the politicians who control the IAs 
become the de facto owners of the associations.  Such a change threatens the 
viability of the IAs, whose logic of design is based upon the assumption of 
farmer ownership.   
To maintain the operation of the IAs, the government plays an important 
role.  By a series of policy measures that set the bound for the operation of 
the IAs, the government has effectively minimized the extent of possible 
rent-seeking activities.  These measures have been mainly focused on two 
areas.  The first is the imposition of financial prudence.  The IAs are not 
allowed to spend the money they have earned from property sales on 
activities other than irrigation.  Also the amount of subsidies to the IAs is 
tightly controlled.  In the words of a senior government official whom I 
interviewed, “as long as the IA staff do not command too much financial 
resource, they cannot do too much harm.”  The second is to work out better 
laws and regulations for the operation of the IAs.  Instead of relying solely on 
administrative control as before,13 the government has been trying to codify 
rules and laws that could provide a better legal framework for the operation 
of the IAs.   
Complementarity and embeddedness have enabled Taiwan’s irrigation 
systems to adapt and adjust to the changing environment.  Of course, both 
complementarity and embeddedness have their limits.  When infrastructure 
is considered to be able to replace farmers’ effort, and when IA staff are 
thought to be able to replace the IG leaders, the vibrancy of the system could 
easily be undermined (Lam, 1996b, 2001, 2004).  What is more unfortunate is 
that individuals might not be even aware of the loss.  When the deterioration 
reaches the threshold, cascading effect in terms of rapid deterioration could 
happen.   Particularly, embeddedness would work only if the IAs remain 
vibrant and autonomous entities.  When they are so embedded with the 
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government that they lose their autonomy and self-organizing capacity, they 
could become de facto subordinate organizations of the government. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the challenges posed by the change in the macro political 
economic environment, Taiwan’s irrigation systems have shown a high 
degree of resilience to external shocks.  Although irrigation seems to be 
fading to the background, the irrigation institutions have succeeded in finding 
new niches and developing new capacity to thrive.  The general pattern is 
that while the sector as a whole has been in flux and gone through many 
changes, the vibrancy of the system remains. 
The major finding is that the design of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions has 
been able to cope with the dynamics inherent in the SES.  It allows various 
actors and organizations at different levels to engage in continuous learning 
and adaptation.  Having said that, however, resilience does have its limit.  
The viability of Taiwan’s irrigation management ultimately hinges upon a 
certain degree of involvement and commitment of farmers.  While 
institutional design can help reduce the level of demand for farmers’ 
commitment and self-organizing effort, it is no perfect substitute.  When 
farmers totally retreat from the tripartite endeavor, and irrigation 
management becomes no more than the battle of sexes between the 
government and IA officials, the collapse of the system can be expected. 
 
 32 
 
References 
 
Agricultural Engineering Research Center (AERC). (1999). Review on the 
Functional Adjustment for the Irrigation Associations in Taiwan (I). 
Chungli: AERC. (In Chinese) 
Agricultural Engineering Research Center (AERC). (2000). Review on the 
Functional Adjustment for the Irrigation Associations in Taiwan (II). 
Chungli: AERC. (In Chinese) 
Agricultural Engineering Research Center (AERC). (2001). Review on the 
Functional Adjustment for the Irrigation Associations in Taiwan (III). 
Chungli: AERC. (In Chinese) 
Agricultural Engineering Research Center (AERC). (2003). Drafts of Irrigation 
Rules and Regulations. Taipei: Council of Agriculture. (In Chinese) 
Agricultural Engineering Research Center/International Irrigation 
Management Institute (AERC/IIMI) (1997). A Study on Maintaining 
the Utility of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan. Taipei: Council of 
Agriculture. (In Chinese) 
Amsden, A.H. (1988). “Taiwan’s Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a 
Challenge to Dependency Theory.” In R.H. Bates, Towards a Political 
Economy of Development (pp. 142-175). Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Anderies, J.M., Janssen M.A., & Ostrom E. (2003). “Design Principles for 
Robustness of Institutions in Social-Ecological Systems.” Working 
Paper, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. 
Arthur, W.B. (1991). “Designing Economic Agents that Act Like Human 
Agents: A Behavioral Approach to Bounded Rationality.” AER 81(2): 
353-59. 
Arthur, W.B. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Axelrod, R. (2003). “Risk in Networked Information Systems.” Working Paper. 
University of Michigan. 
Axelrod, R. & Cohen M.D. (2000). Harnessing Complexity. NY: Basic Books. 
Berkes, F. & Folke, C. (1998). Linking Social and Ecological Systems. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Berkes, F., Colding J., & Folke, C. (2003). Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: 
Building Resilience for Complexity and Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 33 
Buchanan, M. (2002). Small World. London: Phoenix. 
Camazine, S., Deneubourg J.L., Franks, N.R., Sney, J., Theraulaz, G, & 
Bonabeau, E. (2001). Self-Organization in Biological Systems. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Chen, S. C. (1997). Irrigation Associations Under the Sun: A Statistical 
Analysis of the Operation of the Associations. Irrigation Magazine, 
43(4), 36-47. (In Chinese) 
Chinese Agricultural Engineering Association (CAEA) (1995). A Feasibility 
Study of Turning the Irrigation Associations into Governmental 
Agencies. Taipei: Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association. (In Chinese) 
Costanza, R., Low, B.S., Ostrom E., & Wilson, J. (2001). Institutions, 
Ecosystems, and Sustainability. Boca Raton: Lewis Publishers. 
Council of Agriculture (COA). (2003). Agricultural Statistics Yearbook 2002. 
Taipei: Council of Agriculture. 
Denzau, A., & North, D.C. (1994). “Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and 
Institutions.” Kyklos 47: 3-31. 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. (2002). Statistical 
Yearbook of the Republic of China 2002. Taipei: Executive Yuen. 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. (2003). Statistical 
Abstract of National Income in Taiwan Area, The Republic of China 
1951-2003. Taipei: Executive Yuen. 
Evans, P. (1996). Government Action, Social Capital and Development: 
Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy. World Development, 24 (6), 
1119-1132. 
Foster, K.W. (2001). Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: 
State Dominance of Society? Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 35(4), 84-109. 
Gunderson, L.H., & Pritchard, L. Jr. (2002). Resilience and the Behavior of 
Large-Scale Systems. Washington: Island Press. 
Gunderson, L.H., & Holling, C.S. (2002). Panarchy: Understanding 
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington: Island 
Press. 
Janssen, M.A. (2002). Complexity and Ecosystem Management. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Janssen, M.A., Anderies, J.M., & Ostrom, E. (2003). “Robustness of 
Social-Ecological Systems to Spatial and Temporal Disturbance 
Regimes.” Working Paper, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis. 
 34 
Jen, E. (2002). “Stable or Robust? What’s the Difference?” Working Paper, 
Santa Fe Institute. 
Johnson, S. (2001). Emergence. NY: Penguin Books. 
Jones, B.D. (2001). Politics and the Architecture of Choice. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Jones, B.D. (2002). “Bounded Rationality and Public Policy: Herbert A. Simon 
and the Decisional Foundation of Collective Choice.” Policy Sciences 35: 
269-84. 
Jones, B.D. (2003). “Bounded Rationality and Political Science: Lessons from 
Public Administration and Public Policy.” Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 13(4): 395-412.. 
Kauffman, S. (1995). At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of 
Self-Organization and Complexity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kauffman, S. (2000). Investigations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kuo, S.W.Y. & Liu, C.Y. (1999). The Development of the Economy of Taiwan. 
Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 13(1), 36-49. 
Lam, W. F. (1996a). Institutional Design of Public Agencies and Coproduction: 
A Study of Irrigation Associations in Taiwan. World Development, 
24(6), 1039-54.  
Lam, W. F. (1996b). Improving the Performance of Small-Scale Irrigation 
Systems: The Effects of Technological Investments and Governance 
Structure on Irrigation Performance in Nepal. World Development, 
24(8), 1301-15.   
Lam, W. F. (1998). Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal: Institutions, 
Infrastructure, and Collective Action. Oakland: CA: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies (ICS) Press. 
Lam, W. F. (2001). Coping with Change: A Study of Local Irrigation 
Institutions in Taiwan. World Development, 29(9), 1569-92. 
Lam, W.F. (2004). “Reforming Taiwan’s Irrigation Associations: Getting the 
Nesting of Institutions Right.” in Asian Irrigation Systems in Transition: 
Responding to the Challenges Ahead, eds G. Shivakoti, W.F. Lam, D. 
Vermillion, E. Ostrom, U. Pradhan, and R. Yoder. New Dehli: Sage. 
Lam, W. F., Lee, M.S., & Ostrom, E. (1997). The Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework: Application to Irrigation Policy in Nepal. In 
D.W. Brinkerhoff (Ed.), Policy Analysis Concepts and Methods: An 
Institutional and Implementation Focus (pp. 53-85). JAI Policy Studies 
and Developing Nation Series, Vol. 15. Greenwich, CT:JAI Press. 
Lansing, J. S. (1991). Priests and Programmers. NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 35 
Lansing, J. S. (2002). “”Artificial Societies” and the Social Sciences.” Sante Fe 
Institute Working Paper 02-03-11, Sante Fe, NM. 
Liao, C. H., Huang, C. C., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (1986). The Development of 
Agricultural Policies in Post-War Taiwan. Taipei: Academia Sinica. 
Moore, M. (1989). The Fruits and Fallacies of Neoliberalism: The Case of 
Irrigation Policy. World Development, 17(11), 1733-50. 
Moore, M. (1993). Economic Structure and the Politics of Sectoral Bias: East 
Asian and Other Cases. Journal of Development Studies, 29(4), 79-128. 
North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1992). Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems. 
San Francisco, CA: ICS Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1994). Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action. Journal 
of Theoretical Politics, 6(4), 527-62. 
Ostrom, E., & Gardner, R. (1993). Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: 
Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 7(4), 93-112. 
Ostrom, E., & Janssen, M.A. (2002). “Beliefs, Multi-Level Governance, and 
Development.” Working Paper, Workshop in Political Theory and 
Policy Analysis. 
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994). Rules, Games & Common-Pool 
Resources. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, V. (1997). The Meaning of Democracy and the Vulnerability of 
Democracies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
Pingali, P.L., Hossain, M, & Gerpacio R.V. (1997). Asian Rice Bowls. NY:CAB 
International. 
Stavis, B. (1974). Rural Local Governance and Agricultural Development in 
Taiwan. Ithaca, NY: Rural Development Committee. 
Simon, H.A. (1962). “The Architecture of Complexity.” Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society 106(6): 467-82. 
Simon, H.A. (1981). The Sciences of the Artificial. 2nd Edition. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Simon, H.A. (1985). “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science.” American Political Science Review 79: 293-304. 
 36 
Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association (TJIA) (1992). Irrigation Associations 
Statistical Data 1991. Taichung: Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association. (In 
Chinese) 
Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association (TJIA) (1995). Irrigation Associations 
Statistical Data 1994. Taichung: Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association. (In 
Chinese) 
Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association (TJIA) (2000). Irrigation Associations 
Statistical Data 1999. Taichung: Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association. (In 
Chinese) 
Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association (TJIA) (2003). Irrigation Associations 
Statistical Data 2002. Taichung: Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association. (In 
Chinese) 
Taiwan Joint Irrigation Association (TJIA) (2000). Introduction of Irrigation 
Associations in Taiwan, Republic of China. Taichung: Taiwan Joint 
Irrigation Association. (In Chinese) 
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Wade, R. (1995). The Ecological Basis of Irrigation Institutions: East and South 
Asia. World Development, 23(12), 2041-2049. 
Waldrop, M.M. (1992). Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of 
Order and Chaos. London: Penguin Books. 
Water Bureau. (1996). A White Paper on Water Resources. Taipei: Ministry of 
Economy. (In Chinese) 
Watts, D.J. (1999). Small World: The Dynamics of Networks between Order 
and Randomness. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Watts, D.J. (2003). Six Degrees. New York: Norton & Co. 
Williams, J. F. (1994). Vulnerability and Change in Taiwan’s Agriculture. In M. 
A. Rubinstein (Ed.), The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (pp. 
215-233). NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Wu Huang, S. (1993). Structural Change in Taiwan’s Agricultural Economy. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 42(1), 43-65. 
 
 37 
 
Endnotes 
                                               
1 As of 2001, more than 37% of the heads of farm households in Taiwan were over 65 of age 
(COA, 2003). 
2 As of 2001, there were about 726,000 farm households in Taiwan, which was about 10% of 
the total number of households in the country.  Such a percentage had remained quite steady.  
It is interesting to note that the number of total number of “full-time” farm households, who 
derive their major income from farming, has been on the rise in the last ten years.  In 1992, 
there were about 100,000 full-time farm households in Taiwan; by 2001, the number had 
increased to more than 140,000 (COA, 2003). 
3 A majority of farmers are unwilling to sell their lands.  When the old farmers pass away, 
instead of selling their lands, their sons will inherit and divide the lands among themselves.  
As a result, the number of farming households has increased. 
4 As of 2000, the annual precipitation of Taiwan was 90.5 billion cubic meters; about 19.5 
billion cubic meters of water was available for use.  About 15.4 billion cubic meters was used 
for agriculture. 
5 This study adopts the definition of resilience developed by Gunderson and his colleagues.  
Resilience is measured by the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the 
system is restructured with different controlling variables and processes. 
6 During the period from 1993 to 1997, government subsidy on average accounted for almost 
70% of the total expenditures of the IAs.  For detailed figures and analysis, see AERC (1999). 
7  Irrigation Associations in Taiwan have long played an important role in political 
mobilization.  At the times when Taiwan was under the authoritarian rule of the Nationalist 
Party (the Kuomintang (KMT)), the IAs, together with other semi-governmental organizations 
such as the Farmers’ Associations, were used by the government to allocate resources and 
hence political powers to local politicians in exchange for their political loyalty.  Given that 
these organizations control major agricultural resources and are tightly controlled by the KMT, 
they have been effective political mobilization mechanism for elections.  Even nowadays the 
KMT is no longer the ruling party and the IAs do not have as tight control over farmers’ 
voting as before, the IAs are still mainly controlled by the KMT.  Of the 17 IA chairmen, 16 of 
them are KMT members.  The Chairman of the Joint IA is a member of the Central 
Committee of the KMT. 
8 As of 2001, more than 92% of Taiwan’s farm households had a landholding size of less than 
1 hectare. 
9 As of 2001, the average annual income for farmers per capita was about NT224,000 (around 
US$6,600 in 2001), which was around 70% of the average annual per capita income for 
non-farm households. 
10  Camazine et. Al. (2001) defines parameter turning as the occurrence of bifurcation—a 
sudden transition from one pattern to another following a small change in a parameter of the 
system. 
11 For detailed discussions of Taiwan’s irrigation institutions, see Lam (1996a, 2001, 2004) and 
Moore (1989). 
12 I was particularly impressed by the development and sharing of farming techniques by 
farmers that give better and more paddy yields while using less water.   
13 In the past, the interaction between the IAs and the central government was mainly through 
administrative orders by the government.  A consequence was that while the IAs tended to 
rely on the government for decisions; the government found itself not having sufficient 
resources to exercise effective control and created administrative bottlenecks.  Interestingly, 
the lack of laws and regulations allowed room for political bargaining and manipulation, 
which often resulted in inconsistency. 
